Akademik Veri Yönetim Sistemi
BRISMES Annual Conference 2019: Joining The Dots, Interdisciplinary in Middle East Studies at University of Leeds, Leeds, Birleşik Krallık, 24 - 26 Haziran 2019, ss.14
Abstract/Özet:
The Obama administration’s Syria policy was based on
non-intervention or minimal presence from the beginning of the civil war. Even
though the rise of ISIS led some US policymakers to take a position calling for
intervention, the Obama administration stuck to its non-minimal intervention
policy. Accordingly, particularly the Pentagon sought a reliable ground partner
in Syria to fight ISIS. In the early stage, the Syrian Opposition was
considered as the central ground force. However, the Syrian Opposition
prioritised the overthrow of the Assad regime instead of defeating ISIS.
Although the US approached Turkey for that role, Turkey could not take the risk
to fight ISIS on behalf of the US. Yet the US had other options: interactions
between US officials and the PYD-YPG Kurds had begun even before Kobane though
its direct aid to the PYD-YPG Kurds during Kobane brought the Kurds to the
centre stage in US policymakers’ eyes. This paper questions the main reasons
behind how the Syrian Kurds have become a reliable US partner. Relying on data
from US parliamentary debates, US newspapers and interviews with US
policymakers and approaching this from strategic framing theoretical framework,
this paper argues that ISIS, which came to be defined as a global security
threat, the Syrian Opposition’s divergent priorities and Turkey’s reluctance
have forced the US to approach the PYD-YPG Kurds as ground partners in their
battle against ISIS.
Key Words: US Foreign Policy,
Syrian Civil War, Strategic Framing, Kobane, Syrian Kurds, ISIS